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Abstract 
Global Interdependence and Eliminating War in the Twenty First Century. 
Monica Durham, (Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois) University Undergraduate Fellow, 1998-1999, 
Texas ARM University, Department of Political Science 
The logic is intuitive: as nations' interests become more global, as international trade and world 
economies become more complexly linked, the costs of war to nations should increase as well. 
Moreover, as this increasing inter-connectedness shifts the sources of conflict and of interstate 
power, warfare should be limited as well. Indeed, the increasing interdependence of nation-states 
has been discussed by scholars and observers as a potential litniting factor on interstate war. 
However compelling, this notion has yet to be well tested quantitatively. In addition, it is not 
clear what the combined effect of several individual indicators of global interdependence would 
have on war. The underlying concern of this research is the possibility of eliminating war by 
studying the relationship between war propensity and global interdependence. For the purposes 
of this study, two indicators of interdependence are used: annual international trade (an indicator 
of economic interdependence) and political alliances (to measure political interdependence). 
Using these two measures of the interdependence of nation-states, this study examines whether 
the dependence of a state's wealth on the international market and its level of political 
interconnectedness are associated with its likelihood to engage in interstate conflict. 
Global Interdependence and L'liminating War in the Twenty First Century 
There has been virtually no war among the forty-four wealthiest nations since 1945 
(Mue))er 1989: 4-5). This does noi mean that there has been absolutely no war since 1945, 
rather that the wars that have taken place have not involved more developed countries on both 
sides. The logic is intuitive: as nations' interests become morc global, as international trade and 
world economies become more complexly linked, the costs of war should increase as well. 
Moreover, as this increasmg interconnectedness shifts the sources of conflict and ol interstate 
pov:cr, warfare should be limited as well. Indccd, increasing interdependence of nation-states 
has been discussed by scholars and observers as a potential limiting factor on interstate war. 
However compelling, this notion has yct to be well tested quantitatively. In addition, it is not 
clear what the combined effect of several individual mdicators of global interdependence 
(political, economic, etc. ) on war might be 
The underlying concern of this research is the possibility of eliminating war. Its focus is 
the relationship between conflict propensity and global interdependence. For the purposes ol 
this study, two indicators of'interdependence are used annual international trade I'an indicator 
of economic interdependence) and political alliances (to measure political interdependence). 
Using these two measures of the interdependence of nation-states, this study examines whether 
the dependence of a state's wealth on the international market and iis level of political 
inicrdependence are associated with its likelihood to engage in interstate conflict. 
This paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews rclcvant literature 
concerning interdependence, trade, alliances, and conflict. Section three presents the analytic 
method. This is succeeded by a discussion of the empirical results and conclusions. The final 
section discusses ihe implications of this study and suggests some areas lor future rcscarch. 
Literature Review 
Interdependence and Democratic Peace 
There is nov, a considerable body of litcraturc documenting what has been called ihe 
closcsi thing lo a law that exists in the field of political science - the robust finding that 
democracies do not fight each other (Singer and Small 1976; Rummel 1983, 1985, 1996; Chan 
1984: Ray 1987, 1995; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992, ' Russett 1993, ' Wcart 
1997). However, it is also known that democracies arc not less war prone than other types of 
governments; they simply do not fight eaclr or/ier (Maoz and Abdolali 1989: 31-32). In a much 
debated essay, Francis Fukuyama (1989) suggests that economic liberalization within a state 
inevitably promotes political liberalization and democratic reforms. Since thc dominant actors 
in thc global system are democratic capitalist states, it is not unreasonable to suggest that other 
nation-states should mcrcasingly turn toward economic and pohtical liberalization in order to 
benefit from thc system. Integrating Fukuyama's argument with the findings of the democratic 
peace literature suggests that the spread of economic and political interdependence, by way of 
economic liberalization and global democratization, should minimize the incidencc of war. 
Although ihe relationship behveen democracy and war has received careful attention, 
students of international affairs have done remarkably little rcscarch concernmg ihc relationship 
between global intcrdepcndcnce and interstatc conflict. This is despite thc fact that thc worth of 
interdependence as a means of minimizing conflict has been espoused by philosophers since the 
early 17th century (e g. , Hume, Kant, Montesquieu, the Physiocrats). Since the 17 ' century and 
indeed since the end of World War II, political and economic affairs have become increasingly 
linked. Interstate transactions and flows of money, goods, people, and information have 
increased dramatically, overall ivorld trade has grown more than seven percent since 1945 and 
levels of direct foreign investment has grown even faster (K. eohane and Nye 1989). 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were among the Ilrst contemporary scholars to 
hypothesize that nations wlio are complexly linked will not engage in militarized conflicl. . In 
pr&wer and InterrIependence, Keohanc and Nye (1989: 8) clarified the definition of 
interdependence by tirsi defining dependence as a state of being affcctcd by cxtcrnal forces; 
interdependence, therefore, means mutual dependence. Thus, interdependence refers to a 
situation in which two or more siaies are dependent on one another in order to meet certain 
needs and/or desires, whether those needs are security, economic, or politically-related. 
Conseiluently, those states arc restrained from making certain decisions that may affect thc states 
that rely on them, or on ivhich they rely. In other ivords, interdependence relers to independent 
actors who wish to preserve their identity, but who are structurally affected by others' behavior 
(de Wilde 1991: 17). 
Keohanc and Nye (1989: 25) propose that one feature of interstate relations characterized 
by interdependence is that "military Ibrce is not used" and that "the more complex the network 
ol relationships in which countries are involved, thc sironger the constramts on all-oui war " 
Complcxily in reference to interdependence refers to the depth of the connections between iv:o 
or more states, thc number of states that arc linked, as well as thc breadth of linkages between 
those states. Again, interdependent states arc less likely to make conflict decisions based on 
narrow understandings (single-dimension) of the implications of their actions. Rather, the more 
dependent they are on their allies and international trade relations, the greater the conslraint on 
all-out war, However. as compelling as this proposition may sound, it has yct to be verified 
quantitatively. 
'I'he growth of interdependence that has occurred since ihe end ol'World War II has also 
been accompanied by a new focus on prosperity and democracy. John Mueller (1989: 221) 
slates ihat developing nations are coming io ihe conclusion ihai 1 he most imporiani goal is 
economic growth. Mueller (1989: 223) goes even further by predicting that "there will be no 
war [as long as humans [ hold prosperity to bc their overriding goal. " It seems logical that as 
more finns engage in the global economy in order to expand their markets and increase proliis, 
this limitation on conflict v:ill continue; wars involve significant costs to firms and governments. 
Likewise, as countries increasingly adopt democratic ideals and political processes, conflict will 
become more costly to political leaders dependent on popular support in order to stay in power. 
Although a few wars have turned short term economic andror political proliis, the risk of loss 
(even in victory) associated with military conflict is great enough that political leaders generally 
require a high probability of very subsiantial gain in order to compensate for that risk. With thc 
expansion in scope and depth of interstate intcrdcpcndence, the sources of the costs ol'ivar have 
risen as well. 
In short, interdependence limits war because ii increases ihe costs (economic and 
political) of war io intolerable levels. In the economic sphere, public expectations of prosperity 
inhibit governments I'rom using force that would disrupt economic yowrth. Politically, it should 
bc increasingly difficult lor allied states to make decisions based solely on their own countries; 
decision makers must increasingly take into account the alfcct their decisions will have on their 
own position regarding benefits (security or otherwisc) that they can derive from the alliance in 
the iuiurc. Since prosperity is enhanced by political and economic interdependence, and 
"because ihe conviction has become wide-spread that whatever value war might conceivably still 
have for obtaining some goals, it is particularly counierproductivc in the quest for prosperity" 
(Mueller 1989. 222), it can be argued that interdependence encourages a reluctance to go to war 
due io ihc fear thai a conflict will disrupt beneficial trade routes andior involve other nation- 
states by way of networks of alliances 
Trade 
General agreement on the notion thai svar is inconsistent with economic progress has 
given strengrth to the belief that increased international trade limits war (Mueller 1989; Keohane 
and Nye 1989) William K. Domke (1988: 43) slates the following 
The grow4h of international commerce marks a most dramatic change in global relations, 
one that has generated many notions of transformation, not only in economic exchange, 
but also in social and political relations. 11 modernization facilitates international 
commercial exchanges, then economic interests may grow to challenge government's 
preoccupation with security. 
This means that a government's interests in security alone will be undermined by the desire to 
maintain profitable trade relations. Thus, economic interdependence poses both an external and 
an internal constraint on decisions for war (Domke 1988: 46). "The external constraint is ihc 
increased vulnerability thai comes from economic interdcpcndcnce, svhich raises the costs of 
breaking prolitable trading relations and directing resources away from commcrce and toward 
war" (Domke 1988: 46). The internal consiraini [which would apply most specifically to 
democratic or other regimes whose leaders take into account popular opinion] arises from the 
growing public expectations of prosperity that typically accompany increased trade (Domke 
1988: 46). Together, these constramts pressure governments to cooperate vi ith one another in 
order to satisfy their own desires to maintain profitable relations with other countries and also to 
satisfy public demands for economic growth. 
There have been relatively fev empirical assessments of the direct effect ol trade on 
conflici involvement. Moreover, ihe results ol' si. udics on Irade and war and/or disputes short of 
v ar, have been conflicting and often times confusing. In one of the earliest studies concerning 
trade and war, Russcii (1967) I'ound that states linked by trade during ihc years 1945 67 werc 
more than twice as likely to fight as nations without strong economic ties. Barbieri (1995 
1996a) also found that incrcascd trade increases ihe likelihood of a militarixed dispute, both 
before and alter World War Il. In direct opposition to Russett*s and Barbicri's results, 
Wallensteen's (1973) study of the period from 1920-68 found a negative relationship between 
trade and conflict when ihe entire period was considered; thc results were noi consistent, 
however, when he divided the time into thrcc sub-periods. 
More recent studies have provided more support for thc notion that trade does have a 
limiting effect on conflict involvement. I'or example, Domke (19IIS) found that countries that 
export more are less lil-ely to initiate wars. In addition, Mansflicld (1994) found that high levels 
ol trade reduce the numbers of wars initiated over I'ive years. Mansfield, like Polachek (1992), 
concluded that trade has a signilicant negative effect on ihc level of conflict a country is likely to 
be involved in. Finally, Gas&orowski (1986) as wrell as Ducal and Russett (1997a) have found 
thai importance of trade (measured as a percentage of GDP) is inversely associated with a state' s 
likelihood of involverncnt in conflict Thai is, thc more a state's wealth was dependent on trade, 
ihe less it became involved in international conflict. 
Although recent research has generally found that trade relations are negatively 
associated wilh conflict between states these findings do not ncccssarily provide robust support 
for the notion that trade has a limiting effect on war. Clearly more research ~s necdcd to support 
ihe hypothesis that economic tnterdependence does indeed limit interstate conflict. Furthermore, 
other forms of interdependence (such as political mterdependence as measured by alliances) 
should be considered as well. 
Alliances 
In thc first emptrical analysis of thc relationship bctwccn alliances and war Singer and 
Small 1968) found that alliances were "positrvely correlated with years of war, number of v ars, 
and number of battle deaths. However, Ray (1989) and Wecdc (1983) hypothesize that alliances 
may prcvcnt democracies from becoming involved in mihtanzed d&sputes. According to 
CIochman and Sabransky (1991: 94), "alliances can prcvcnt war through deterrence or, i I' 
deterrence fails, help nations win whatever war comes along. '' Indeed, one study has shown that 
alliances increase ihe chances for victory by 7 percent for the initiating side and 14 percent for 
the target side of war (Bueno dc Mesquiia 1981). In addition, it been found that aligned nattons 
are no more likely than non-aligned nations to initiate a conflici (Bueno de Mesquita 1981) 
Conversely, it has also been found that allies are far more likely than expected to engage in 
conflict with one another (Bueno dc Mcsquiia 1981, Wccde ! 983; Maoz and Russcit 1992). 
'I'hercforc. scholars disagree about thc direct eiTects alhances have on conflict 
involvement. The findings so far have been conflicting, and thus inconclusive. Hence, in 
addition to providing insight into whether interdependence has a limiting effect on conflict, this 
research svill also shed light on the question ol whether alliances specittcally do or do not have a 
ltmiting effect on conflict. 
Analytic Method 
Research Design 
The data used in this study covers all mdependent states (for which trade data were 
available) using the Small and Singer (1982) list of interstate system members during the 1951- 
1985 period. 'I'his study focuses on thc post-World War II cra for both thcorctical and practical 
reasons. It is in this era when a dramatic incrcasc in the number of states occurred. As the 
number of states increased, the number of interstate interactions increased as well Likewise, thc 
opportunities for interstate conflict increased. This is also an cra that observed a dramatic 
bnowth in mterdependence A key practrcal reason for focusing on this era is the availability of 
data for most of the states during this period. Whereas data on alliance partimpation is readily 
available for the 1816-1986 penod, trade data frequently is unavailable for years prior to World 
War II 
Three datasets were utilized for this study. Data on militarized disputes came from the 
Militarized Interstatc Dispute (MID) dataset, which is a subset of the Correlates of War project 
at thc University of Michigan. Data on trade came from 1993 International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) figures compiled by Oneal and Russet (1997a). Finally, data on alliance membership was 
taken from Singer and Small (1968). 
Measures of Variables 
1. Iniersiaie (. 'onfhch The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset divides annual 
conflict data into five categories, in order of conflict escalation: no conflict; a nueai ro use 
&ni l&rory /i&rce by at least one member of a nation-state dyad, a display o/' &n&l&(ary force by at 
least one member of a dyad; actual use o//i&rce by at least one member of the dyad; and warfare. 
2. I. 'conorn&c Inre&clependence. Trade figures are used as the basis for measure ol the 
economic interdependence measure. Following Oneal and Russett (1997a), importance of trade 
to a state's economy (i. c. , its dependence on foreign trade) is calculated as total imports and 
exports divided by income (GDP). 
3. I'oh&ical Inrerdependence. Data regarding alliance membership was used to measure 
a state's political linkages. 'I'wo countries were considered allies if they are formally allied, 
lollowing Singer and Small (1968), or if both are allied with the Umted States. 
'I'he following hypotheses arc tested empirically: 
Hypothesis I: Nation-state dyads characterized by high levels ol'trade 
dependence are less likely to engage in serious (J&sp/ay o/nt&I&rarv 
/'orce, use of &n&liiary force, war) contlicts than less dependent 
dyads. 
Hypothesis 2: Allies are less likely to become involved in serious conflict than 
arc non-allied states. 
The erst analysis conducted tests the elfect of economic interdependence on cont)ict 
participation. The second analysis examines the relationship betsveen political interdependence 
and cont1ict participation. The analylic measures used in both are discussed below. 
Results 
Economic Interdependence and Level of Conflict 
A 2x2 ANOVA was conducled to test whether trade dependence does indeed have a 
signtficanl impact on thc level of conflict participation [F (I, 12, 126) = 19. 20, p&. 000]. The 
ANOVA results show a signi I)cant main effect. Taking a closer look (as shown below in Figure 
I ), there appears to be a mitlgatmg effect on war involvement associated with trade dependence. 
While increasing levels of dependence are associated with increasingly serious conflict, there 
appears to be a threshold at war participation. In the case of warfare, the majority ol wars 
involve states that are less economically dependent. While indirect, this indicates that close and 
mutually dcpendcnt relationships (interdependence of states), while allowing more possibility 
for serious disputes, also limit resort to warfare. 
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Political Interdependence and Level of Conflict 
Crosstabulation was used to test the impact of an allied relationship on conflict behavior. 
As hypothesized, the presence of an alliance relationship has a significant mediating effect on 
the incidence of war involvement. As Table l (shown below) suggests, only 3. 7 percent of wars 
involved allies. However, the degree to which alliances did not restrict lower levels of conflict is 
extremely surprising. Fully one third of the conflicts involving thsplays of mihtary force and 
uses of military force were between allies, whereas over one half of the conflicts involving only 
threats to use military force were between allies. Thus, as is the case with economic 
interdependence, political interdependence also appears to have a significant limiting effect on 
warfare, but not on conflicts short of war. 
Table 1: Political Interdependence and Conflict Crosstabulation, n = 16, 383 
Conflict Type 
Threat to Use Military Force 
Allied 
6Q'10 
'Yo of States 
Not Allied 
40'yo 
Display of Military Force 36. 5'yo 63. 5'/o 
Use of Military Force 33 2aro 66. 8'yo 
Warfare 3. 7'ro 96. 30yo 
What might expiain this interdependence-related barrier to warfare, but not other forms 
of conflict? Although answering this question will require further analysis, it may be that states 
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who are allied may need only make a threat to demonstrate that they are serious in a conflict 
situation. In other words, the credibility and seriousness of a threat once made, and the multiple 
risks of it being carried out is more assured between allies. This may also explain whv alliances 
actually seem to encourage conflicts that involve rlzreazsio zzxe zzzilirrzry force as well. Perhaps 
interdependence limits war lbut not conflicts short of war) because it does indeed raise the costs 
of warfare io an intolerable level, while lesser levels of conflict remam tolerable. Or perhaps 
there is some kind of institutional understanding that allies do not go to war with one another. 
Combined Effects of Economic and Political Interdependence on Level of Conflict 
Since only 3. 7 percent ol'wars occur between allies, it appears that alliances arc a strong 
predictor of thc likelihood that a state svill be involved in a full-scale war. This is despite the 
degree to which that state is economically dependent on other states. However, at lower levels 
of conflict, political and economic interdependence both affect the likelihood of conflict. 
Lookmg at Figure 2 (shown below), it seems that there is some interaction between levels of 
political and economic interdependence. For example, conflicts that involve a rfzreaz (o use 
nzzlzrary frirce are morc common among allies, yet also more common among states that are 
barely dependent on each other. Moving up the escalatory ladder, conflicts that involve a 
Replay rzf mzfztnryfizrz. c are less common among allies, but more common among somewhat 
dependent states. Moving up thc ladder again, conflicts that involve an actual use of nnfziuvy 
fbrcc are less common among allies, bui more common on highly dependent states. Therefore, 
there appears to be a more active response i. o conflict among non-allied, interdependent states. 
Finally, in the case of actual svarl'are, frequency ol conflict is extremely low among allies, and it 
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seems that there may be some effect of level of dependency as well; however, it appears that 
alliances have the greater limiting effect on warfare. Thus, while economic interdependence 
appears to have a mediating effect on war, political interdependence has the more profound 
effect. 
Figure 2: Political and Econolnic Interdependence 
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Conclusion 
For many years, political scientists, historians, and philosophers have argued that 
interdependence has a pacifying effect on interstate conflict involvement. The preceding 
analyses investigate the relationship between interdependence and conflict propensity. 
Specifically, the effects of trade-related economic and political interdependence on conflict 
behavior were examined. In general, the resulis suggest that there may bc some merit to the 
notion that mutual dependence among states has a mediating effect on war. 
Interestingly, the analysis of economic interdependence indicated that while the 
hypothesized inhibiting effect appeared where conflicts escalated to warfare, the reverse was 
true of less serious conflicts, especially those that involve uses of mifitury force While 
increasing levels of economic dependence are associated with increasingly serious conflict, this 
does not hold true for conflicts involving full-scale war. In the event of war, the majority of 
these conflicts involve states that are less economically dependent on each other This indirectly 
indicates that interdependent relationships, while allowing for the possibility of more serious 
disputes, also limit resort to warfare. 
As is the case with economic interdependence, the data also suggests that political 
interdependence has a significant limiting effect on war. This is evidenced by the fairlv stronu 
relationship between alliances and lack of war. However, it is also important to note that 
alliances do not have a limiting effect on lower leveLs of conflict Thus, alliances do have a 
mediating effect on war, but not on conflicts short of war, 
Finafly, although interdependence docs appear to have a limiting effect on warfare, it is 
obvious that interdependent relationships are not inherently pcacelul Some scholars i Brown 
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1987; ICeohane and Nye 1989) have hypothesized that the likelihood of war depends on the 
nature of the interdependent relationship. I'or example, cases where one nation is highly 
dependent on another, either I'or its economic livelihood or national secunty, could produce 
intolerable circumstances in which thc more dependent country may decide that it is 'worth a 
war' to alleviate the situation (Brown 1987: 64'). Indeed, if the issue is a matter of 'life and 
death, ' as some thought oil was dunng Desert Storm, then the resort to conflict may be desirable. 
Implications and Realms of Future Research 
War is so destructive that any insight into how ii can be limited, or even eliminated has 
profound academic as well as international political implications. Academically, this study of 
interdependence and its effect on conflict adds to ihe existing body of knowledge concerning 
conflict and/or war. In addition, studying interdependence and its effect on conflict should 
further develop and affect the way scholars study war in the post-Cold War era. In the realm of 
politics, a deeper understanding of the connection between interdependence and conflict will 
affect the way governmenis make decisions about economics, conflicts, and cannot be 
discounted when making decisions about security. Specifically, this research clarifies the 
previously conflicting answers to the question of whether or not alliances have a positive or 
negative effect on conflict propensity by finding that alliances are strongly associated with lack 
of war, but not necessarily with conflicts short of war. 'I herefore, this research is nnportant both 
academically and politically in that it provides important knowledge about intcrdcpcndence and 
the likelihood of conflict in our world today. 
The possibilities for future research concerning interdependence and conflict are vast; 
clearly this research is only a piece of the puzzle. There are many indicators of interdependence 
other than trade and alliances that would provide valuable insight into the connection between 
interdependence and conflict. For instance, in addition to international trade, other indicators of 
economic interdependence such as indirect and direct foreign investment should be assessed for 
their impact on conflict. I'urthermore improved data on international trade, foreign investment, 
and other such indicators of interdependence would be of considerable use to researchers 
engaged in this issue. As lar as political interdependence is concerned, measures such as 
diplomatic exchanges should also be investigated to discover their effects on interstate conflict. 
Clearly, scholars still have much to do to investigate the effects of different political and 
economic indicators of interdependcncc on war, as well as ihe elfecis of other categories of 
interdependence, such as technological or resource interdependence. 
Given that this research (due to data constraints) focuses solely on the Cold War era, it 
would also be extremely valuable to look at thc cffccts of interdependence on conflict in the 
post-Cold War years. The world has changed so much since the end of the East-West conflict; 
an analysis of the effects of interdependence on conflict m the post Cold War era is essential to 
understanding and perhaps improving relations bctwccn peoples and states m the next century 
and beyond. 
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